



Risk Management Report

April 2017

Changes in this Report:

- PACICC's Risk Limit-Risk Appetite is now \$1.67 billion (2016) – twice the Corporation's annual general assessment capacity.
- Key indicators of P&C solvency risk expanded to include *large swings in premium volume* (See page 4).

Risk Profile

- Risk 1-3 – rate regulation – impact and likelihood ratings for this risk changed in response to Audit & Risk Committee feedback (see footnote on page 2).

Emerging Risks

- Risk 3-2 – PACICC coverage limits – full Board discussion is recommended.
- Risk 3-3 – new insurance products – all risks noted are now rated, and comments were added regarding potential solvency implications of cyber crime coverage.
- Risk 3-7 – Insurtech was added as an emerging risk.
- Risk 3-8 – FINTECH was added as an emerging risk.

Contents

PACICC ERM Summary

Risk Profile Grid and rating criteria	2
Risk Limit-Risk Appetite	3
Key indicators of P&C solvency risk	3

Current Risk Summary

Risk Register

Section 1 – Major and Significant Risks to be addressed	6
Section 2 – Risks to be monitored.....	10
Section 3 – Emerging Risks	14

Appendix

PACICC Risk Management Definitions	17
---	-----------

Risk Profile Grid (as at April 2017) – PACICC’s Risk Profile remains stable ¹

Impact Rating	Very High	Financial Risk 1-1 Insolvency costs exceed risk limit-risk appetite				PACICC’s priority risks (risk profile) 1-1 A catastrophic earthquake or other factor causes a very large insurer to fail, or leads to multiple, smaller insolvencies; resulting insolvency costs exceed PACICC’s risk limit-risk appetite (twice our annual general assessment capacity) 1-2 Supervisory practices below minimum IAIS standards 1-3 Rate regulation causes insolvency 1-4 Outdated winding-up legislation 1-5 Adverse changes in new legislation 1-6 PACICC could be forced to increase coverage and benefits 1-7 Risk 1-1 places extraordinary demands on human resources 1-8 Lack of member financial data results in unexpected insolvency costs 1-9 Much of Canada’s accumulated P&C liquidation expertise has “retired”
	High		Regulatory Risks 1-5 New laws 1-6 Benefits enhanced			
	Medium		Operational Risks 1-7 Resource demands 1-8 Unexpected insolvency costs	Regulatory Risks 1-3 Rate regulation Operational Risks 1-9 Lack of liquidator expertise		
	Low				Regulatory Risks 1-2 Solvency supervision 1-4 Outdated winding up legislation	
		Very Low	Low	Medium	High	

Likelihood Rating

Impact Criteria Ranking	Low	Medium	High	Very High
a) Financial Risk	< \$ 5 million	\$5 to \$500 million	\$.5 to \$1.5 billion	>\$1.5 billion
b) Operational Risk	<\$100 thousand	\$.1 to \$1.0 million	\$1.0 to \$2.0 million	>\$2.0 million
c) Reputation Risk	Isolated complaints	Regulatory involvement	Wide media involvement	Government intervention
Likelihood Criteria Ranking	Very Low	Low	Medium	High
All risks	Occur < 1 / 100 years	Occur within 10 years	Occur within 5 years	Occur within 1 year

¹ Rating for one risk (Risk 1-3) was changed: impact rating increased from ‘low’ to ‘medium’; likelihood rating decreased from ‘high’ to ‘medium.’

Risk Limit-Risk Appetite


PACICC's current Risk Limit-Risk Appetite is \$1.67 billion. PACICC measures its Risk Limit-Risk Appetite in relation to its ability to collect funds from members over a two-year period to pay for the eligible claims of insolvent members.

PACICC's maximum annual assessment capacity is 1.5 percent of the total covered premiums of members. Based on the most recent annual industry results, 1.5 percent of covered premiums equates to \$837.3 million (as stated in Note 9 to PACICC's audited financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2016).

As of this Report, two times PACICC's annual assessment capacity of \$837.3 million thus yields a Risk Limit-Risk Appetite of \$1.67 billion.


In addition, PACICC maintains a Compensation Fund to address liquidity issues in the period immediately following a member insolvency. The current market value of the Compensation Fund (as at December 31, 2016) is \$53.4 million.

Key indicators of P&C solvency risk



There has been a steady “deleveraging” of P&C premiums in relation to capital over the past 40 years – from a ratio of 2 to 1 in the mid-1970s, to an approximate 1 to 1 ratio now.


Insurers with large swings in premium volume



3

Large swings in premium volume for individual insurers is a key indicator of solvency risk. (PACICC defines “large” in this context as greater than +/- 33% in a single year). This indicator of solvency risk has been trending down in Canada for more than a decade.


Losses in consecutive years



5

Since 2010, the number of PACICC member insurers incurring losses in (two) consecutive years has trended down – although the last two years (2015-16) show an uptick.

MCT to DPW, 2016



Most PACICC members currently maintain an MCT/BAAT ratio that is well above the regulatory minimum of 150%.

Section 1: Major Risks (red) and Significant Risks (yellow) to be addressed

Risk Priority Coding

	Major risks
	Significant risks
	Risks to be monitored
	Emerging risks

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse Impact	Mitigation/Controls	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
1-1	<p>Financial Risk Insolvency costs exceed PACICC's risk limit-risk appetite (twice our annual general assessment capacity)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A catastrophic earthquake resulting in the insolvency of one of PACICC's 10-largest member companies (or their parent companies) ○ Concurrent, multi-member insolvencies ○ An extensive major financial crisis leading to multiple insolvencies (triggering factors could include: higher inflation, adverse reaction to market volatility, and higher interest rates) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ PACICC has partnered with IBC to lobby for a government backstop ○ Prepared an extensive analysis of the industry's capacity to manage catastrophes (Natural Disasters and Catastrophes – 2013; a follow-up report was completed using 2016 industry data and released to PACICC members and other stakeholders in February 2017) ○ PACICC has completed work on a proposed Extraordinary Assessment Mechanism; consultations with industry and regulatory stakeholders have validated its usefulness and workability. However, the Mechanism is "on hold" until it becomes clear whether the industry (IBC) will succeed in securing a government backstop. (Note: this leaves the residual risk for PACICC Risk 1-1 unchanged for an indeterminate period) ○ PACICC has a Compensation Fund of \$53 million under our control to meet immediate requirements ○ Regulators monitor insurer exposure to earthquake (OSFI Guideline B-9) ○ IBC has a committee reviewing impact of the costs of extreme earthquakes ○ PACICC commissioned RMS Canada to develop accurate estimates for a large earthquake that could trigger member insolvency 	Very High	Very Low

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse Impact	Mitigation/Controls	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OSFI periodically conducts scenario stress testing exercises for correlated risks 		
1-2	Regulatory Risk Certain provincial regulators have limited solvency supervision resources and expertise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insurance legislation and/or regulations at the provincial level do not contain adequate standards for insurance solvency supervision Practices do not meet the minimum standards of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) Failure to execute supervisory activities due to inadequate staffing and resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PACICC advocates that P&C provincial solvency supervision meets IAIS standards CCIR established a Solvency Supervisory working group PACICC has developed an intervention guideline; updated its Model Winding-Up Order; developed information materials for distribution to all regulators; and conducted seminars with the regulators in B.C., Alberta, Ontario, Quebec and Newfoundland during the past three years PACICC has established a Pre-Insolvency Regulatory Liason (PIRL) Committee consisting of the public Directors of the Board, to facilitate that the regulators can share sensitive information 	Low	High
1-3	Regulatory Risk Regulation of insurance rates may contribute to member insolvency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political pressure exerted on the rate filing/approval process (e.g. Ontario, to reduce auto insurance rates) Incorrect assumptions regarding what constitutes an adequate rate of return for an insurer Insurance companies are not permitted to challenge the decisions of rate regulators if they disagree Weak regulation of actuarial practices for pricing and loss reserving in some provinces Some politicians have discussed regulating property rates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Scrutiny of insurance company financial condition by rating agencies, supplemented by PACICC's own financial analysis Use of risk-based supervision by regulators PACICC research on the relationship between solvency and rate regulation PACICC encourages senior staff at OSFI to communicate concerns regarding the regulation of rates (for example, automobile insurance rate reduction) to provincial supervisors when they deem it appropriate PACICC is seeking to strengthen provincial regulation of actuarial practices. It is also seeking more information about the role of consulting actuaries in the regulation of insurance rates 	Medium	Medium

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse Impact	Mitigation/Controls	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
1-4	Regulatory Risk Insurance company winding-up and restructuring legislation and practices in Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Canada's Winding-up and Restructuring Act (WURA) has not undergone a comprehensive review in nearly 100 years Insolvency management and restructuring practices have evolved internationally more than in Canada 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PACICC made a detailed submission to Finance Canada proposing specific changes to modernize WURA. The submission was made in response to a periodic five-year review of Federal financial-legislation PACICC has initiated stakeholder discussions about the difficulties expected with a complex, conglomerate failure 	Low	High
1-5	Regulatory Risk Changes in (or new) insurance legislation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government could enact legislation affecting aspects of PACICC's operations (e.g. membership eligibility, industry funding, reporting procedures, Board composition, regulatory oversight, etc.) PACICC could be compelled to add members in a line or lines of business inconsistent with its current mandate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of policyholder coverage and benefits is scheduled as PACICC's 2018 strategic priority Maintain regular dialogue with industry regulators to ensure that possible risks and exposures are understood Active monitoring of industry developments and financial performance Regular communication with stakeholders to ensure that PACICC's mandate is clearly understood 	High	Low
1-6	Regulatory Risk Benefits unilaterally enhanced by government regulators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Broader interpretation of insurance policy wording by courts and regulators Regulators could require the industry into funding higher premium refunds than currently provided (max of \$ 700 per policy) Regulators force coverage of certain specialty lines, where the assessment base could be insufficient to fund the insolvency costs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain a good understanding of financial guarantee fund best practices in other countries Educate stakeholders on best practices Continue to advocate that moral hazard risk be minimized and that protection apply to personal lines and business policyholders, but excluding large corporations 	High	Low

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse Impact	Mitigation/Controls	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
1-7	Operational Risk Extraordinary demands on human resources with insolvency of larger member, group, or concurrent multiple member failures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Large or multiple insurer failures could require: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> high volume of requests for claims settlement authority and/or resolution of related issues; complicated assessment process; extensive queries. PACICC needs to outsource functions and could have difficulty administering with existing staff Loss of “key persons” at PACICC could exacerbate this risk 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PACICC has developed a Claims Management Contingency Plan to address this risk. The plan was approved by the Board in November 2010. It was most recently reviewed in April 2017; management believes the plan remains up-to-date and provides an effective framework for mitigating this risk Regular dialogue takes place with regulators to discuss troubled members and to ensure adequate preparedness New agreements with provinces on intervention guidelines, starting with Quebec, should improve PACICC’s ability to plan for adverse outcomes Succession plan in place to help mitigate “key person risk” 	Medium	Low
1-8	Operational Risk Insolvency costs greater than anticipated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Member insolvency occurs, but PACICC has no or limited financial data and is unable to properly calculate insolvency costs in advance Deficient loss reserves and/or inadequate pricing are key causes of insurer failure (deficient reserves are hard to detect in advance) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We advocate that regulators make insurer financial data publicly available (consistent with PACICC position paper). Some success was achieved with Alberta in 2009 From publicly available data and voluntary disclosure, PACICC has financial data for all but 12 of its member companies (as at Dec 2015) We encourage provincial insurance supervisors to adopt the IAIS standards of solvency supervision Continue dialogue with regulators and members to gain better understanding of marketplace 	Medium	Low
1-9	Operational Risk Loss of liquidation expertise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ageing and pending retirement of licensed trustees in bankruptcy with experience liquidating P&C insurers Firms have limited ability to assemble, on short notice, a full team of qualified professionals A sustained period of good financial health in the P&C insurance industry has diminished opportunities to train successors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PACICC’s concerns have been communicated to insurance supervisors and to the leading firms that provide insurance company liquidation services PACICC’s ability to mitigate this risk is limited. Although the estimated financial impact in a single calendar year may be modest, we consider the likelihood of occurrence to be “medium” (meaning the risk could occur within five years – especially in the event of a member insolvency) 	Medium	Medium

Section 2: Risks to be monitored (not currently considered 'Major' or 'Significant')

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse Impact	Mitigation/Controls	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
2-1	Operational Risk Collecting member assessments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some members may not understand their payment obligations Deliberate non-payment due to disagreement or dissatisfaction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Members are required by legislation to pay assessments. The rules are specified in the Memorandum of Operation PACICC notifies regulator to compel payment of overdue accounts 	Very Low	Low
2-2	Financial Risk Economic downturn impacts member; i.e. liquidity, return on investments and business results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> New financial products are poorly developed and generate large unexpected or unintended losses Investment capital held by insurers declines in value and yield Credit availability reduced 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor the financial condition of members (where adequate data available) Monitor efforts by legislators and solvency regulators to address the underlying causes of economic downturn 	Low	Low
2-3	Financial Risk Changes in interest rates and inflation (impact on PACICC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lower interest rates reduce rates of return on investments Poor investment choices reduce rate of return Ratings downgrade(s) could reduce the value of investments held 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regular reviews (at least annually) of investment policy by A&R Committee PACICC uses a professional investment manager A senior PACICC manager is assigned responsibility for overseeing investments 	Low	Low
2-4	Operational Risk Property and liability insurance coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PACICC's coverage could prove inadequate for insurable losses (e.g. business interruption, loss of records, cyber attack) Improper actions (e.g. breach of duty or conflict of interest) by officers or directors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Annual review of insurance policies and limits PACICC's By-laws provide that member assessments can be made if claims exceeded the D&O insurance policy limit 	Low	Low

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse Impact	Mitigation/Controls	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
2-5	Operational Risk Operating expenses exceed budget	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unanticipated large capital or operating expenditure, e.g. IT Accounting changes (for example, Board decision to pay investment management fees from the operating budget rather than from the Compensation Fund) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operating Fund surplus (approx. \$1.5 million) can, with Board approval, fund a short-term budget deficit without asking members to pay additional assessments 	Low	Low
2-6	Regulatory Risk Use of unlicensed reinsurance in Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unlicensed reinsurance is difficult to collect for an insolvent insurer Unlicensed reinsurers not subject to Canadian insurance regulation Unlicensed reinsurance contract may not contain an insolvency clause OSFI Guideline B-3 has removed the 25 percent limit on unlicensed reinsurance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitor changes in the use of unlicensed reinsurance and review with OSFI changes in the share of unlicensed reinsurance OSFI Guideline B-3 requires each insurer file a Reinsurance Risk Management Plan (RRMP), which addresses use of unlicensed reinsurance 	Low	Low
2-7	Regulatory Risk Non-profit tax exemption for investment income	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existing policies “reinterpreted” by the CRA to challenge the tax-free status of PACICC’s investment income from Compensation Fund CRA is conducting audits of non-profit corporations to check for activities <i>intended</i> to be profitable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain a good understanding of the tax treatment of guarantee funds in other countries Work with guarantee fund counterparts in Canada, should PACICC need to counter a tax-related threat 	Low	Low
2-8	Regulatory Risk Regulators seek to exert more influence over PACICC governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insurance regulators seek to expand PACICC mandate to address restructuring Regulators are encouraged by other stakeholders to merge PACICC with larger financial guarantee funds Regulator requires all Board members to be public directors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue discussions with stakeholders stressing effectiveness of current governance Regulators invited to Board meetings and receive copies of proceedings PACICC has <i>Code of Ethics and Business Practices</i> and an annual attestation International P&C guarantee fund boards typically have a majority of industry directors 	Low	Low

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse Impact	Mitigation/Controls	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
2-9	Operational Risk Attract and retain knowledgeable and experienced personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Senior staff leaves PACICC to accept other employment, for personal, financial or health reasons ○ Lack of adequate succession planning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Staff could be borrowed short-term from IBC, Assuris, CDIC, and/or members ○ HR policies and procedures documented ○ A management succession plan is overseen by the Governance and HR Committee of the Board ○ The succession plan was last reviewed by the Committee in November 2016; it is PACICC's practice to review it annually 	Low	Low
2-10	Operational Risk Reliance on IT outsourced operation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Service provider removes service ○ Equipment issues not readily resolved ○ Unauthorized access ○ Cyber attack: viruses, hacker, data breach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ PACICC uses an externally hosted, secure, internet-based server that provides full back up and recovery ○ All staff are equipped to work offsite when required using own PC equipment 	Low	Low
2-11	Operational Risk Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Power outage, ice storms, floods where entire community shut down affecting the availability of staff and infrastructure (as per recent actual events) ○ Other possible events include: flu pandemic (SARS), terrorist attack, large-scale natural disaster 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ HR policies and procedures in place, with outsource agreement with IBC ○ Website available to communicate with stakeholders ○ DRP is documented, including working off-site, and is in place ○ Insurance in place ○ Fire-proof safe for protecting original documents 	Medium	Low
2-12	Operational Risk Inadequate or insufficient resources and/or funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Failure to gather and analyze sufficient information regarding current industry practices ○ Inadequate coordination with other financial guarantee funds ○ Necessary functions not performed ○ Lack of controls leads to fraud, misappropriation, security breaches, inaccurate or incomplete reporting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ PACICC is sharing information with domestic and international guarantee funds ○ Management ensures the Board is advised of operating issues ○ OECD suggests that increasing "co-insurance" could be effective practice (this could, however, result in reputation damage) 	Low	Low

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse Impact	Mitigation/Controls	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
2-13	Operational Risk Ineffective governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Fraud not prevented or detected ○ Security breach not prevented or detected ○ Unauthorized access causes loss of data or compromises integrity ○ Incomplete or inaccurate reports prepared 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ PACICC Board places significant emphasis on good governance practices ○ PACICC has followed lead by OSFI for enhancing governance in the industry – OSFI Guideline E-13 and CSA Guidelines 	Low	Low
2-14	Operational Risk Insurers fail for various reasons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Products not properly developed or rated ○ Products provide unexpected coverage, e.g. court interpretation ○ Losses greater than expected , e.g. claims staff not properly trained 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Memorandum of Operations limits PACICC's coverage to 7 classes of insurance. (Policies outside these 7 classes are not covered policies) ○ PACICC has the ability to estimate liquidation costs through its own modeling ○ Coverage and Benefits review, scheduled for 2018, should address potential inadequacies in current limits 	Medium	Low
2-15	Operational Risk Failure of a financial conglomerate involving multiple Guarantee Funds	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ International failure of organization with Canadian branch or subsidiary ○ Domestic conglomerate with Life and or Deposit-Taking affiliates ○ Powers of various Guarantee Funds are inconsistent, e.g. CDIC has more extensive powers and can create a "bridge bank" in the event of a failure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ While PACICC maintains regular contact with other financial guarantee funds in Canada (including CDIC), the organization's ability to mitigate this risk is limited 	Medium	Low
2-16	Operational Risk Key suppliers of services and outsourced arrangements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Unanticipated failure could impair PACICC operations in the short-term while alternate arrangements are made (new supplier contracted or new equipment sourced) <p>(Key outsourced service areas include: IT supplier, Accounts payable, Investment management, Banking and Legal)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ PACICC retains established, reputable suppliers with proven experience ○ Service level agreements are in place (for example, IT) ○ While the loss of service by a supplier could be disruptive in the short term, management believes that PACICC's current outsourced service arrangements could be replaced quickly (in most cases within one month) 	Low	Low

Section 3: Emerging Risks

Most of the risks below have been preliminarily rated “low.” As more information develops – particularly about the potential of these risks to cause solvency problems for PACICC members – the ratings could change.

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse impact	Comments	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
3-1	Operational Risk Risk of non-covered policies impacting covered portfolios	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Members that participate in the Nuclear Insurance pool in Canada incur major losses, leading to possible insolvency 	While covered lines are clearly defined in PACICC’s Memorandum of Operation, it is difficult to mitigate potential “spillover” solvency risk from non-covered lines. Analysis of potential impacts could help PACICC better understand this risk.	Low	Low
3-2	Financial Risk PACICC coverage limits may prove inadequate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Price of homes increasing Price of insurance cover increasing (\$700 cap per policy on unearned premium refund may be inadequate) Claims limits could be inadequate, especially in the case of total property losses 	<p>The Board may decide to review PACICC’s coverage and benefits. (The issue will be raised in the 2017-19 PACICC Plan). The Board could also decide to cover losses beyond PACICC’s limits in exceptional circumstances.</p> <p>The potential for reputation damage due to a sizeable shortfall in PACICC coverage has been highlighted by loss claims from the Fort McMurray wildfire.</p> <p><i>* Recommended action: discuss this risk with PACICC’s full Board.</i></p>	Medium	Low
3-3	Financial/Operational and Regulatory Risks As new insurance product(s) emerge, PACICC’s coverage may need to be clarified	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Driverless cars Drones (for commercial use) Cyber crime coverage (see italicized comment in next column) Flood insurance 	Emerging risks/ policies in the four areas noted as triggers would appear to be covered by PACICC. Driverless cars are still several years away from wider commercial availability (5 to 10 years, according to experts). While the other three risks are already occurring, the potential to cause insurer solvency problems appears to be low. Cyber insurance may be an exception, particularly if the coverages offered turn	Low	Low

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse impact	Comments	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
			out to be poorly understood by some insurers, and/or the pricing does not fully reflect the risks involved.		
3-4	Regulatory Risk Increased requirements for consumer education and awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Consumers not aware of coverage provided by PACICC ○ Financial Literacy initiatives of government ○ Increasing international regulatory initiatives 	While this risk seems unlikely to pose significant financial cost to PACICC, the potential exists for reputation damage if government/ regulatory expectations increased.	Low	Low
3-5	Financial Risk P&C industry consolidation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ P&C industry consolidation results in PACICC having a greater number of "large" member insurance companies 	<p>Data show that P&C industry concentration in Canada has increased over the past decade. Comparing data from 2006 (earliest available from MSA) and 2015 reveals the following:</p> <p>DWP for Canada's top-10 P&C insurers increased from 37.9% of total premiums in 2006 to 48.5% in 2015.</p> <p>The number of PACICC member insurers reporting total unpaid claims reserves > twice PACICC's annual assessment capacity (our risk limit-risk appetite) increased from 11 companies in 2006 to 15 companies in 2015.</p>	Low	Low
3-6	Regulatory Risk Peer-to-peer commerce poses new and possibly disruptive insurance risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Peer-to-peer (P2P) service providers like Uber, Airbnb, et al. pose different insurance risks compared with traditional (and often more regulated) service providers. Will these risks be adequately covered by our industry? Could possible solvency risks emerge? 	<p>PACICC should continue to monitor developments in the P2P sector, particularly as they relate to insurance.</p> <p>Key issues relating to P2P insurance start-ups/networks include: how would they be licensed or regulated in Canada? If undercapitalized, they could pose greater solvency risks. Would PACICC be</p>	Low	Low

Risk No	Inherent Risk and Description	Triggers for adverse impact	Comments	Rating	
				Impact	Likelihood
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ P2P insurance networks also have the potential to disrupt traditional forms of insurance. Part of their appeal is the prospect of lower costs, which advocates claim will come from dividends or return of premiums. 	expected to cover an insolvent P2P insurer?		
3-7	<p>Financial Risk The rise of Insurtech is a potential P&C insurance “disruptor” that could introduce solvency risks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ P&C insurance companies that fail to adopt these new technologies (encompassing Artificial Intelligence, data analytics, and the Internet of Things) may be uncompetitive with respect to underwriting expertise and expenses ○ There may also be a risk of P&C insurance companies “over-leveraging” insurtech as an attempt to gain competitive advantage. (Insurtech capabilities notwithstanding, underpricing and inadequate reserving remain the principal causes of P&C insurer insolvency) 	PACICC will continue to monitor insurtech developments for potential industry disruption, new business products, and possible solvency implications	Low	Low
3-8	<p>Financial Risk New financial technologies could pose risks to the stability of the financial system</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ FINTECH has the potential to disrupt the stability of bank funding, credit quality – and possibly even the stability of the broader economy ○ FINTECH developments appear to be outpacing the ability (and resources) of regulators to keep up. 	Warnings related to the potential systemic risks of FINTECH have been sounded recently by the Financial Stability Board, for example.	Low	Low

Appendix

PACICC Risk Management Definitions

Note: The following definitions are based on the ISO 31000 2009 Plain English Risk Management Dictionary, with minor edits as appropriate for PACICC's risk management environment.

Risk

Risk is the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” and an *effect* is a positive or negative deviation from what is expected. Organizations strive to reduce uncertainty as much as possible.

Uncertainty is a state or condition that involves a deficiency of information and leads to inadequate or incomplete knowledge or understanding. In the context of risk management, uncertainty exists whenever the knowledge or understanding of an event, consequence, or likelihood is inadequate or incomplete.

Risk management (Enterprise Risk Management – ERM)

Risk management refers to a coordinated set of activities and methods that is used to direct an organization and to mitigate or control the many risks that can affect its ability to achieve objectives.

The term *risk management* also refers to the architecture that is used to manage risk. This architecture includes risk management principles, the risk management framework and risk management processes.

Risk management framework (Risk Management Statement)

A *risk management framework* is a set of components that support and sustain risk management throughout an organization. There are two types of components: foundations and organizational arrangements. *Foundations* include the risk management policy, goals and objectives, mandate, and commitment (Mission and Principles). *Organizational arrangements* include the plans, relationships, accountabilities, resources, processes and activities used to manage the organization's risks.

Risk management policy

A *risk management policy* documents an organization's commitment to risk management and clarifies its general direction and intention. Components include procedures, practices, controls, responsibilities and activities (including their sequence and timing).

Risk management process

A *risk management process* is one that systematically applies management policies, procedures, controls and practices to a set of activities intended to establish the context of risks, communicate with stakeholders and identify, analyze, evaluate, treat, monitor and review risks.

To establish the *context* means to define the external and internal parameters that organizations must consider when they manage risk. External context includes external stakeholders, local, national, and international environment, as well as any external factors that influence an organization's objectives. Key drivers and trends include stakeholder views, perceptions and relationships, as well as social, cultural, political, legal, regulatory, financial, technological, economic, natural, and the competitive environment factors.

Internal *context* includes an organization's internal stakeholders, the approach to governance, contractual relationships, capabilities, culture and standards. *Governance* includes the organization's structure, policies, objectives, roles, accountabilities and decision-making processes. Capabilities include knowledge and resources; human, technological and capital.

Risk assessment

Risk assessment is a three-part process consisting of risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation.

Risk identification is a process that is used to find, recognize and describe the risks that could affect the achievement of objectives. It also includes the identification of possible causes and potential consequences. Historical data, theoretical analysis, informed opinions, expert advice and/or stakeholder input could be used to identify an organization's risks.

Risk analysis is a process that is used to understand the nature, sources and causes of the risks that are identified, and to estimate the level of risk. Analysis is also used to study impacts and consequences and to examine the mitigation and controls that currently exist.

Risk evaluation is a process that is used to compare risk analysis results with risk appetite in order to determine whether or not a specified level of risk is acceptable or tolerable.

Risk Register (as defined by PACICC)

PACICC has compiled a *Risk Register* identifying risks that could cause PACICC not to meet its goals and objectives, including a brief assessment of each risk. More significant risks are then selected for in-depth review and, if deemed appropriate, escalated to PACICC's Risk Profile.

Risk Profile (as defined by PACICC)

PACICC's *Risk Profile* is a graphic presentation and written description of the major risks which could potentially have a significant, adverse impact on PACICC's ability to meet its goals and objectives. The description includes a comprehensive risk assessment (see definition), ranking of the impact and likelihood (probability) of the risk occurring, a description of consequences, and a description of the treatment (action plan) showing owners and timelines. The *Risk Profile* includes any risks that the organization must monitor and manage, regardless of type of risk (for example, financial, operational or reputational).

A *consequence* is the outcome of an event and has an effect on objectives. A single event can generate a range of consequences that can positively or negatively affect goals and objectives. Initial consequences can also escalate through ripple effects.

Likelihood (probability) is the chance of a risk occurring. *Likelihood* can be defined, determined, or measured objectively or subjectively; and it can be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively.

Severity refers to the magnitude of a risk. Severity is estimated by considering and combining consequences and likelihoods. It can be assigned to a single risk or to a combination of risks. Severity is described as Level of risk per ISO 39000.

Risk treatment is a risk modification process. It involves selecting and implementing one or more treatment options – for example, avoiding the risk, reducing the risk, removing the source of the risk, modifying the consequences, changing the probabilities, sharing the risk with others, or simply retaining the risk.

Risk appetite

(As defined by PACICC, with adaption / modification of ISO definitions of Risk Attitude and Risk Criteria)

Risk appetite is a point of reference used to assess and evaluate the significance or importance of an organization's risks. It is used to determine whether a specified level of risk is acceptable or tolerable. An organization's *risk appetite* also defines its general approach to risk, for example, whether risks should be retained, shared, reduced or avoided, and whether or not risk treatments are implemented or postponed.

Residual risk

Residual risk is the risk left over by determining the inherent risk of an activity, then reducing the risk based on the organization's governance and control processes, and specific risk-mitigation measures.

The key objective in monitoring risks on the Risk Profile is to ensure that action plans serve to reduce residual risk. Mitigation strategies may include removing the source of the risk, modifying the consequences, changing the probabilities, transferring the risk or retaining the risk.